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For far too long we have busied ourselves with thinking about ways to change the city. It is 
about time we let the city change the ways that we think.  
(Kishik 2015: 95) 
 
Descent  
In early January, 2014, I met with the Vice-Provost of Felician College to inform her that the 
upcoming Spring semester would be my last.  Unexpectedly, my voice waivered and my eyes 
grew moist as I said my piece.  To be sure, intentionally leaving my full-time position in 
philosophy, even at a school that did not grant tenure, was frightening, especially without gainful 
employment waiting in the wings.  But the real driver of my decision, and what I realized was 
rendering it so dramatic, was not dissatisfaction with a particular appointment but 
disenchantment with my chosen profession.  I no longer wanted to be an ‘academic philosopher.’  
The moment was emotionally fraught because I was severing a significant facet of my identity: I 
was walking away from a world that I had immersed myself over the previous 24 years – more 
than half my life at the time.  I was leaving The Academy behind.  
 Walking away from a career as a philosophy professor is not the same as walking away from 
being a philosopher.  That aspect of my identity was – and remains – non-negotiable, for though 
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very much changed by choice and chance, I continue to become the person I set out to be when 
deciding to major in philosophy thirty years ago.  The new challenge I gave myself in the 
summer of 2014 was how to maintain my identity outside of academia.  Living in New York 
City and raising three young boys (ages 7 and under at the time; now all three attending New 
York City public schools), I thought it fitting that I attempt to be a city philosopher – in 
particular, a New York City philosopher – and so I created the Gotham Philosophical Society, a 
non-profit corporation with the mission of using “the critical rigor and creative imagination of 
philosophical thought to transform the civil, political, and educational institutions of New York 
City.” 
 The need to justify this enterprise beyond satisfying my imperative to continue doing what I 
loved to do was easy enough.  New York is continuously evolving, but the social and political 
discourse (such that it is) concerned with that evolution is almost wholly devoid of philosophical 
clarity and insight.  Hence my city’s trajectory is, perhaps unsurprisingly, determined by those 
with the greatest appetites for money, power, and prestige, rather than by those inclined toward 
reasoned deliberation concerning the conditions necessary for New Yorkers to flourish.  Yet this 
is not because those running the city have rebuffed the philosophers (though no doubt they 
probably would); the situation, from my perspective, is more disturbing than that: most of the 
city’s philosophers appear unwilling to enter the public arena. While New York can boast of an 
exceedingly high concentration of philosophical talent as per a frequently-sited metric such as 
the Philosophical Gourmet Report, with students traveling from all over the globe to study with 
them, their names remain unknown to the city at large.  Too few of the city’s thinkers show 
much interest in crossing the notional divide separating the classroom from the city streets.1  
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Hence too many of New York’s philosophers are at once here and not here.  They live and work 
in the city, but their work is neither of nor for the city.   
 These twin difficulties – and they are indeed related – provide the Gotham Philosophical 
Society with its reason for being.2   The city suffers from the lack of the critical perspective 
philosophers can provide and as a result the conversations that shape its present and conceive its 
future are primarily characterized by near-sighted self-interest, conceptual shallowness, and 
fatalistic cynicism.  The reputation of philosophy, and so the community of philosophers, suffers 
when a bloodlessly abstract conception of philosophical activity is permitted to prevail in the 
public consciousness.  To maintain (if not in word then certainly in deed) that philosophy is a 
discipline requiring careful study under the guidance of a credentialed professional within a 
suitably circumscribed space perpetuates its widespread reputation as irrelevant.  Whether this 
reputation is deserved is somewhat beside the point, but philosophers have, I believe, 
considerable incentive to counter it.  As colleges and universities continue their transformation to 
a business model that engages students as consumers, the number of philosophy departments 
facing retrenchment is bound to grow unless a compelling case can be made for their value.  Any 
such case, I shall argue here, should be staked to the very cities where philosophers earn their 
bread.  Philosophical activity without regard for the needs of people in our urban communities is 
an intellectual activity without practical relevance, and fittingly described as ‘academic.’     
 
The Philosophical Significance of the City 
When Socrates quipped that “I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are 
my teachers, and not the trees or the country” (Plato 2006: 230d), he was doing more than telling 
off Phaedrus for poking fun at his reluctance to travel beyond Athens’s walls.  Socrates was 
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expressing a central tenet of his personal worldview, one that he fatefully maintained to the end 
when he found neither a life in the city without philosophy, nor a philosophical life in exile, as 
worth living.  This stance is generally held up as a testament to the value of philosophy, an 
activity so vital and important that this man of impeachable integrity chose to die rather than live 
without it.  To keep the focus here, however, risks missing the urban forest for the philosophical 
trees.  Socrates certainly held philosophy up as the most profound human activity, and so the 
most essential, yet to be banished from the city was to be cut off from the source of its 
significance, that is from the very conditions that make philosophy worth doing.   
 The importance of the city to questions of justice is obvious and familiar (see Nicol, this 
volume on how Plato used the role of the city-soul analogy in the Republic to make the case that 
well-ordered cities and well-ordered souls are mutually dependent).  But it is philosophy itself, 
and not merely certain philosophical issues, that the very nature of urban life inspires.  This is 
because “the city defines man.” (Fell 1997: 26).  Looking back at the beginnings of the European 
tradition, George S. Fell finds that for the ancients,  
“[t]he polis is the beginning of man both as to history and as artifice. Because in the city man 
first becomes conscious of himself, for it is the community which gives him his problems: his 
language and its myriad confusions; the images on the wall – appearance and reality, the one 
and the many, autonomy and heteronomy. The city awakens philosophy from slumber. 
Whatever man qua man is, mere exemplification of homo sapiens was looked upon by the 
Greeks as philosophically uninteresting. It is man under nomos, not physis, who is the proper 
concern of thought.” (Fell 1997: 26)   
 
Man under nomos is man under laws, customs, habits, and norms, and it is in the city that the 
regulation of thought and action becomes – because there it is both pressing and difficult – a 
philosophical issue.  In homogenous communities shared practices and perspectives that are 
rooted in a common history provide necessary order and inform group identity and membership. 
Critical meta-analysis of the fittingness or correctness of such practices and perspectives tends, 
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therefore, to be muted.  But given that “the soul of a city lies in its heterogeneity,” (Conlon 
1999/Meagher 2008: 200) the normative status of normative practices is there an open and often 
asked question.   
 Philosophy is the critical reflection on inherently human practices, undertaken in the hope of 
understanding why they exist, how they work, and how they might be improved or superseded; 
the city is philosophically fertile ground because in it the greatest diversity of such practices is to 
be found.  As Paul Tillich observed, “[b]y its nature, the metropolis proves what otherwise could 
be given only by traveling; namely, the strange. Since the strange leads to questions and 
undermines familiar tradition, it serves to elevate reason to ultimate significance.” (Quoted in 
Jacobs 1961: 238)   The city incites us to philosophize because the city is where we can expect 
our assumptions about how to live to be countered.  The city challenges us by presenting us with 
lives lived differently than our own.  In the city we are routinely confronted by choices we have 
not made, beliefs we do not believe, and goals we have not set.  We are, in other words, in 
“continuous propinquity” with the ‘Other,’ and we come to a better understanding of ourselves – 
as individuals and as a species – through that opposition. (Mendietta 2000/Meagher 2008: 222) 
 To commit to living in the city is to embrace “the being together of strangers,” (Young 1990: 
237), and so to accept a form of social life that often seems defined by deep disagreement about 
how the problems of living in community can be effectively and efficiently alleviated (they seem 
rarely, if ever, resolved).  Philosophy, therefore, would appear to be an invaluable tool for 
navigating the urban experience, both for the individual citizen and for our civic institutions.  Yet 
as I noted at the outset, professional philosophers rarely figure in the daily life of my city (nor, I 
gather, in the lives of most others).  Yes, things are changing, and as this volume attests there is a 
growing appreciation among philosophers for the importance of applying their skills in the 
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service of the issues of urban life and in a decidedly more publicly engaged manner.  It is also 
the case that ‘public philosophy’ has taken off, with organizations promoting philosophical talks 
in public spaces and online media outlets (for example, Aeon, The Boston Review, The New York 
Times’ ‘Stone’ column, The Point Magazine) publishing general audience pieces.  The demand, 
however, still far outpaces the supply.  But more to the point, what is too often missing in these 
public efforts is what I would call an appreciation for the provincial.  What I am advocating, and 
what I started GPS to facilitate, is for philosophers to become social-political actors in the affairs 
of their cities, to conceive and carry out their work as a valuable contribution of the local 
intellectual economy.  I want us to consider philosophy as the activity by which we go about the 
business of reconceiving how we live, where we live. 
 Resistance to this conception is institutionally entrenched and driven, I suspect, by the 
influence of a certain sort of culture that pervades the professional philosophical community.  
This culture can be seen in (and is prolonged by) the lack of institutional incentives to prioritize 
civic engagement, incentives that might counterbalance the career-dependent demands to publish 
within the closed-readership of professional journals and presses.  Hence most philosophers 
remain – whether they want to or not – cloistered in the academy.   Lacking a clear sense of what 
an urban-oriented, publicly-directed philosophy might look like, they unsurprisingly prefer the 
comfortable familiarity of the classroom to what they consider the unsettling unpredictability of 
the public square.  In the final section of this chapter I will briefly discuss some of forms 
engaged philosophy might take.  Before doing that, I first want to address the more problematic 
consequence of academic insularity: skepticism about whether such engagement should count as 
‘serious’ philosophy at all.  This attitude results from a particular meta-philosophical view rooted 
in the very beginnings of the Western philosophical tradition, but a view that I will argue we 
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have compelling reason to reject.  We live in a time of considerable political and economic 
turmoil, and it is in the interest of both professional philosophers and the public at large to 
rethink what philosophy is for and what it can do.   
The Academy and the Cave  
“Hostility to philosophy is the natural condition of man and the city.” That remark, made by 
Allan Bloom at the outset of his close reading of Plato’s Republic, (which he recommends we 
study because “it is the first book which brings philosophy "down into the cities"; and we watch 
in it the foundation of political science, the only discipline which can bring the blessings of 
reason to the city.” (Bloom 1991: 310), is worth attention.  Clearly, given the context, Socrates’s 
fate is in the foreground, yet Bloom’s point is ahistorical: to philosophize as Socrates did, as a 
form of political action that invariably calls into question elements of a community’s moral 
identity, is necessarily to court danger.  Our contemporaries George Yancy, Jason Stanley, and 
Kate Mann demonstrate the point.  Having ventured into public space to discuss such matters as 
our attitudes and behaviors with respect to race, gender, and political speech, each has faced 
terrible verbal abuse, including threats to their lives and those of their loved ones.  Not every 
engagement goes this way, of course; these cases are, fortunately, extreme.  Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that the philosopher entering the public realm risks harms and reactions that the 
norms of academia are designed to prevent.3   Whereas to be ‘public’ is to be an open forum for 
citizens to jointly plot (and contest) their future course, the space of ‘academia’ – the classroom, 
the colloquium, the conference, and the college itself – exists to engage colleagues and instruct 
students, and functions as a relatively safe space, at a figurative distance from the hostility of the 
city.4   
  8 
 With our insistence on the putative protections of free inquiry and policies such as tenure, the 
point of which is to shield our thinkers from the intellectual violence that might result from 
feeling bound by the whims of ‘the mob’ and the demands of the marketplace, our contemporary 
‘academy’ retains much of the fundamental significance of its namesake.  The original Akademia 
was a sacred site containing the grove of olive trees to which Plato invited the promising thinkers 
of his day to discuss philosophical ideas.  Located outside the city walls of Athens, it was 
intended as a desensitized space, one at a literal remove from the incessant distractions of life in 
the city.  And from its dangers.  Plato and his fellow thinkers had direct knowledge of the mortal 
risks of philosophizing in the agora, the center of civic life in the Greek city-state, and the locus 
of its social, political, and economic activity.  To retreat from the fray, and create a private and 
protected domain, likely struck them as an eminently reasonable thing to do.  
 Yet when we consider the significance of this separation of academy and agora, especially as 
represented in the foundational metaphor that informs the western philosophical tradition, we 
might wonder whether hostility to the city isn’t a natural condition of philosophy.  For on this 
telling, it is the philosopher who first gets wise to the fact that we unreflectively dwell in a region 
of shadow and illusion.  This cave – the city – is a settlement overrun by self-deceit, a place 
where the pursuits of material gain and sensual satisfaction are paramount, and popular opinion – 
too often a product of lazy mental habits and suspect motivations – reigns supreme.  Under these 
conditions, the philosopher distinguishes herself first by her self-awareness and then by her 
irrepressible need to ascend to the sunlit uplands to see things as they truly are.   There she enters 
a world unspoiled by political machinations and the warping concerns for profit; in this idyllic 
academy, the collegiality of sympathetic truth-seekers fosters the unfettered love of learning.  
And it is at this point, when her victory over confusion is complete, that she is asked to make a 
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hero’s sacrifice: rather than remain in this paradise, she must nobly assume her civic-obligation 
and return to the cave to dispel the ethical and intellectual smog of city life.    
 That the contemporary academic experience falls somewhat short of the Platonic ideal is 
perhaps the least disturbing feature of this self-aggrandizing myth.  The vices of the city – the 
greed, the frequent elevation of personal ambition over civic-minded sacrifice, the gross 
inequality and exploitation – are the vices of humanity, and so it is unsurprising, even if still 
disappointing, that they follow us into the academy.  But it is the picture of philosophical activity 
that I take issue with here, and in particular its application to city-life.  The classical conception 
of these was ably expressed by Bloom’s teacher, Leo Strauss:  
“Philosophizing means to ascend the from the cave to the light of the sun, that is, to the 
truth. The cave is the world of opinion as opposed to knowledge. Opinion is essentially 
variable. Men cannot live, that is, they cannot live together, if opinions are not stabilized 
by social fiat. Opinion thus becomes authoritative opinion or public dogma or 
Weltanschauung. Philosophizing means, then, to ascend from public dogma to essentially 
private knowledge. The public dogma is originally an inadequate attempt to answer the 
question of the all-comprehensive truth of the eternal order.” (Strauss, 1953, pp.11-12)  
 
According to this hyper-realist version of philosophy, it is a method – likely the only reliable 
method – for achieving normative clarity amidst the confusions induced by an imperfect reason.  
Without the private illumination that philosophy provides we are doomed to the darkness of 
public dogma.  Nor should the corrupting power of that dogma (and the mechanisms of distortion 
that produce it) be underestimated.  As Bas van der Vossen has recently argued, political 
philosophers should avoid the seductions of political activism (broadly construed to include any 
political activity from actively campaigning during an election to slapping a bumper sticker on 
your car, to “generally rooting for one side or another”) because being politically active 
“involves seriously exacerbating the risk of becoming biased about political issues.”  Given that 
“task of the political philosopher is to seek the truth about politics,” (van der Vossen 2015: 
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1048), “activist philosophers violate their professional duties. They make seeking the truth about 
political issues needlessly difficult.” (1053)   The title of van der Vossen’s paper, “In Defense of 
the Ivory Tower,” isn’t a justification of the academy so much as an attempt to inoculate it from 
the fevers of the great unwashed who huddle just beyond the university gates.    
While I have no intention of underestimating the number of professional philosophers 
who would find this position untenable, to feature it here is not to take aim at a strawman.  Its 
significance goes beyond the philosophers who hold it.  What we also need to reckon with is the 
extent to which the public takes this to be the received view.  This portrait of the philosopher, 
that is, poses both a philosophical and a public-relations problem.  The former concerns the role 
of truth in philosophy, an interminable debate about which here I will only baldly state that I take 
it to have none: philosophy doesn’t seek the truth about politics or any of the other normative 
domains it concerns itself with because there are no such truths to find.  Normative thinking isn’t 
about finding the truth, it’s about finding one’s way.  A political position (or an ethical one, or 
about what is rational, etc.) involves an orientation towards certain choices and a disposition 
toward certain attitudes.  Some positions might make a particular person’s life go better or worse 
at a particular time, but there’s little sense to assessing them as true or false (see Biehl 2004, 
Biehl 2005).  Truth and falsity (as well as right and wrong, rational and irrational) are not 
independent arbiters of our normative frameworks but are their by-products.  To paraphrase 
Donald Davidson, nothing counts as a reason for (or against) a normative judgment except 
another normative judgment.5 
More pressing for present purposes than confronting the vacuity of this brand of 
inflationary meta-philosophy is stressing how bad it is for business.  Recommending that 
philosophers limit their involvement in an irrational public discourse until they are ready to save 
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it with new-found truths about how to live is a poorly conceived marketing strategy, one that 
shows that excessive exposure to sunlight can confuse a mind as effectively as any shadow on 
the wall.  Such a proposal will likely garner all the ridicule it invites (much of it amusing, no 
doubt) but more’s the pity.  In a climate where funding streams to STEM fields are squeezing the 
life out of the humanities, this isn’t the research program that philosophers should want grant 
makers or legislators to believe they are pursuing.  To those holding the purse strings, this hyper-
realist picture is of a pseudo-scientific discipline that doesn’t deliver.  And that is an assessment 
that is rather hard to argue with; we’d do better to deny the picture that generates it.  To 
effectively counter it, we must encourage a very different conception of philosophy, one that is 
sober-minded about its strengths and sensitive to the actual needs of actual people.  Philosophers 
need to join the fray, not remain aloof from it.    
Central to establishing a more public-facing and urban-aware philosophy is repudiating 
the condescending myth of the cave.  The corollary to rejecting the image of the academy as a 
veridical paradise is to acknowledge that our neighbors in our cities (and the non-academic 
public more generally, even those on social media) are not trapped in a dystopian delusion.  
They, no more so than college professors, are simply living under the constraints of the human 
condition.  Joseph Grange, who has written a book about philosophically understanding the city, 
offers a more sensible perspective when he suggests that “[i]n a city, how things appear to us is 
almost as important as what they are in reality. In fact, urban experience ties appearance and 
reality so tightly together that often it is impossible and unwise to separate them in any final 
way.” (Grange 1999: xiii)   This is better, but I would argue that we can go further still; rather 
than viewing it as a realm where definite reality is being distorted (to whatever degree), we can 
approach our cities as living crucibles from which new human realities are to be forged.  Cities 
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have long been beacons to those intent on reinvention and those hoping to be more than they 
have been.  They are the centers of becoming, concentrated hot-spots of potential bursting into 
actuality.  Humanity is an ongoing, open-ended project whose status at any given time is usually 
most perspicuous in its current urban output.  Philosophers who hope to participate in that project 
must therefore embrace the city, not ignore or flee it.     
 In rethinking the philosophical significance of the city, philosophers must also rethink their 
role in it, which must be importantly different from that which currently prevails in academia.  
Shane Epting’s discussion of transportation justice (TJ) found in this volume, makes the 
difference between them plain:  
“Philosophers of the city could entertain each other through discussing the best-suited 
philosopher in history whose work could benefit how we understand issues in TJ—or we 
could examine patterns of injustice as they emerge on city streets and suburban cul-de-
sacs. There is room for both.  The difference here is that the former is the content that 
fills volumes of journals that make nary an impact on the problems that they cover.  
However, addressing the latter holds the possibility of reaching audiences that might 
benefit from a thorough investigation into a TJ issue.” (Epting 2018: this volume 7 of his 
paper) 
 
The notion of the philosopher as an expert on a certain literature, including the various debates 
and moves within a particular ongoing-historical discussion has legitimate currency in scholarly 
circles.   Beyond them, however, being such an expert matters less than having developed 
expertise in the skills and capacities that are required to fulfill philosophy’s core function, which 
is to explore possible frameworks of thought and action, critically comparing and contrasting 
them for purpose of remaking the human world.  From the perspective of an urban-oriented 
philosophy then, what makes the academy worthy of public investment is that it is a space to 
hone those skills that philosophers can then use to encourage, foster, and facilitate those 
explorations with their fellow citizens.  This is not to claim that ‘philosophy for philosophy’s 
sake’ is without value; the exercise of intellectual curiosity is intrinsically satisfying; indeed, so 
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much so that we have incentive to expose as many people as possible to it.  Moreover, pursuing 
philosophical leads out of the motivation to know rather than their potential impact people’s lives 
can have the unexpected consequence of having such an impact.  But to think of philosophy as 
an exclusively ‘theoretical’ discipline is to possess a needlessly impoverished conception.6   
Consciously or unconsciously, the sorts of questions that philosophy asks frame our options, for 
the answers that we take them to have serve as the fixed points by which we navigate our lives.  
The actual activity of philosophy, the intentional asking of those questions and the interrogation 
of their possible answers, is therefore not an idle luxury but a political imperative.  
 That world as we currently find it – and this is especially apparent in our cities (certainly so 
in my own) – squanders great quantities of its (human) capital.   The majority of people possess 
neither the advantages of inherited economic privilege nor (fortunately, I prefer to think) the sort 
of character that posits the relentless pursuit of material gain and social influence as a virtue.  
Their lives, therefore, are too often marked by struggle – for adequate education, employment, 
and shelter, to name only three – that takes place in the shadow of extreme wealth and 
prosperity.  Most of these people live in cities because of the opportunities (especially, though 
not exclusively economic) they promise, yet that promise is routinely broken.  If we hope to heed 
the anthropologist and urban theorist David Harvey’s call “to chart a path from an urbanism 
based on exploitation to an urbanism appropriate for the human species” (Harvey 1973: 314 
[quoted in Kishik 2015: 93]), then it must be philosophy, through its investigation of our current 
and possible normative commitments, that lights the way.  
 To help urban communities to rethink their route to flourishing is to become what Grange 
calls a ‘master of heartfelt contrast.’ (Grange 1999: 224)   Rejecting the Platonic caricature of the 
“divine being handing down universal edicts,” Grange notes that 
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“what the philosopher can offer the civic process is width of vision that encourages 
alternative ways of looking at problems. And what is more, because the philosopher is 
also expected (at least in the tradition of speculative philosophy) to provide intellectually 
coherent and applicable ideas, the community can expect testable hypotheses, not empty 
generalities. Thus, the philosopher is part of the experimental process of developing 
better ways to live together…The intellectual contribution that the philosopher can make 
to contemporary city lies in the direction of providing a wider understanding of what is 
possible within the real constraints of the urban environment. In short, the philosopher 
ought to become a master of contrast as a way of providing effective modes of thinking 
about divisive issues.” (Grange 1999: 225)  
 
To do this effectively, it helps to exchange thinking universally for thinking locally.  Iris Marion 
Young’s insight that an “ideal can inspire action for social change only if it arises from 
possibilities suggested by actual experience,” (Young 1990: 241) is especially pertinent here: 
philosophers must meet their neighbors in the city where they are, addressing the concerns of 
particular people under particular conditions.  Different communities often face similar 
problems, but the ways forward, those that they can be expected to be invested in, must be 
recognizably their own.  To facilitate the generation of organic proposals, to be mid-wives to the 
birth of home-grown understandings, we must become embedded in the urban sphere, 
contributing to the public discourse rather than remain condescendingly critical of it.  In the next, 
and final section, I discuss some of the forms those contributions might take.         
 
Modes of Engagement 
Throughout this chapter I have insisted on a conception of philosophy as the means by which we 
come to know ourselves, who we are and who we might still become; as an activity that belongs 
to each of us because through it our humanity is continually re-determined.  This is why I believe 
that bringing it outside of the classroom and into the open space of the city is urgent and it is this 
conception that has informed my efforts with the Gotham Philosophical Society.  And the people 
I have met in this work share this conception as well, for they are eager to for the opportunity to 
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participate in discussions of some of life’s profoundest questions or be invited to think through 
conceptual conundrums that have preoccupied philosophers for decades, centuries, and even 
millennia.  “Thank you so much for doing this!” is a comment that I have routinely heard during 
the four years I have been hosting events through GPS, and the sincere enthusiasm and 
appreciation it expresses is deeply rewarding.  These exchanges, unlike the wild swings between 
poles of apathy and entitlement that I frequently encountered from students, reinforce the 
conviction that this sort of philosophical work is vital and necessary.  So, how to do it? 
 The most obvious and natural way for philosophers to participate in the lives of their cities is 
to speak and write for the various communities that comprise them.  Learn who they are and 
what matters to them.  Communicate to their concerns.  Broadly speaking, the topics of these 
efforts needn’t vary greatly from those that philosophers discuss amongst themselves; non-
academics are also interested in ethical, epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetic, political, 
logical matters, sometimes for their own sake and at others for how they figure in the issues that 
pertain to the social and political disputes that so often mark urban living.  Different audiences 
look to philosophy for different things, some wanting real solutions to real problems while others 
prefer to be enriched and learn new things (and very many look for both).   For some, 
philosophical engagements can be revelatory and therapeutic (for both audience and 
philosopher), as in the case of the groups of currently incarcerated, court-involved youth, and 
victims of domestic abuse that ‘ReThink,’ the philosophical community outreach program of 
Columbia University.  For others, it can echo the classic conception of a symposium and 
function as form of entertainment where discussions of the ethical costs of upward mobility, of 
whether the Buddhist denial of the self is compatible with claim that meditation increases mental 
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freedom, or about what tattoos say about personal identity can – especially when had with a glass 
or two of wine – be very stimulating nights on the town. 7    
 In navigating prospective audiences in the city, the significant challenge for philosophers is 
less about what the content of their contributions are to be than in finding the right tone and the 
appropriate language.  That virtually none of the target audiences have spent years immersed in 
the minutia that defines philosophical specialization can make some philosophers new to public 
engagement uncomfortable, but it is their interest to see it as an opportunity.  Philosophers in the 
academy have frequently defended themselves from the charge of irrelevance with the claim that 
they are discussing the very same issues that have preoccupied philosophers for millennia, even 
if the levels of technical sophistication in their debates tend to obscure that. (Stanley: 2010) 
Translating their insights back into the vernacular will not only lend support to this defense of 
professional practice but will also render their wisdom publicly useful.       
 For those looking to make a transformative impact in the actual course of their cities by 
influencing policy debates and inspiring activism that could ultimately reach into the lives of all 
citizens, they will need to enter the city’s political discourse.  The most direct way to do this will 
be by running for elected office, joining community boards, and becoming actively involved in 
school or commercial associations.  Philosophers is such positions can hopefully use their skills 
to facilitate more effective conversations and deliberations about which initiatives and policies to 
pursue and which considerations should be seen as significant to the decision.  Needless to say, 
this degree of engagement is not for everyone.  For many, political participation of an overtly 
philosophical sort will involve writing pieces offering analysis of the implicit assumptions 
underlying various proposals and positions, as well as offering proposals of their own.  The 
obvious venue for these efforts will be the local newspapers and other publications that cater to 
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the city’s politically active and policy-minded audiences.  But I believe that these voices can be 
amplified if philosophers collaborate in the construction of a public-directed philosophical 
infrastructure of their own, one that would encourage and sustain their efforts.  For example, the 
philosophers working with GPS are trying to do this by launching a magazine, Φ on New York, 
that focuses on the philosophical consideration of the issues of living in New York City.8  By 
providing a venue for localized philosophical output, we hope to create a (virtual) space where 
engaged New Yorkers will find sophisticated and thought-provoking treatment of some of the 
perils and possibilities facing the city.  We further hope that all concerned will come to see the 
local professional philosophical community as vital participants in the day-to-day life of the city.       
 Important as all these forms of engagement are, both to the city and to the philosophers living 
in it, I want to suggest that the most profound and consequential endeavor we can undertake is to 
encourage the introduction of philosophy into the pre-college classroom.  The fundamental 
nature of philosophy lends it a generality that permits its application to every other human 
undertaking.  ‘The Philosophy of X’ could be (and often is) the title of a course for any X, where 
X is another academic discipline.  It is therefore understandable that so many – philosophers and 
non-philosophes both – are dismayed at the growing trend of folding philosophy departments.  
Yet it is hard to resist the thought that this is somehow related to the even more troubling fact 
that philosophy is among the only major academic disciplines that is not regularly introduced to 
school-age children.  Perhaps it is an echo of Plato’s skepticism that children possess sufficient 
experience to benefit from philosophy (Plato 1991: 536e-540b); in any case it is deeply 
misguided.   
 The “wonder” that Socrates claimed is the origin of philosophy comes naturally to children, 
as anyone who spends time around them knows.  They are full of “big questions” when they 
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arrive at school but enter a system where there is rarely any forum to indulge them.  The adults in 
the room, constrained by a curriculum that needs to be followed, and under pressure by 
benchmarks that need to be met, have neither the time nor patience to address their boundless 
curiosity.  The all too obvious result is that many children move through elementary and 
secondary education asking philosophical questions less and less frequently, until most stop 
bothering to ask them at all.  We should not be surprised, then, when a considerable number of 
students walk into an introductory philosophy college course with little understanding of what 
philosophy is nor with much interest in finding out.  Learning their early school lessons well, 
they have grown impatient with wonder, and the questions that now concern them have shrunk to 
the small and the “practical.”   
 This situation is lamentable for all involved.  Reserving philosophy for sufficiently mature 
eighteen year olds, and retaining an air of mystery about the subject, does little for the 
discipline’s reputation, in or out of the academy.  Many students resent having to take a course to 
satisfy requirements when they cannot see how it will make them more marketable when they 
graduate, and growing numbers of administrators are taking their side.9  In our age of economic 
and political uncertainty, students and funders alike want to invest their time and money in those 
things that they believe will pay off for them, and they’ve convinced themselves that philosophy 
doesn’t fit the bill.  
 Philosophers, of course, think otherwise, and many others do as well.  What all those who 
think so share is the belief that what is most salient to living a good life or to building a 
flourishing community is not the amount of money one earns but about the choices we make 
concerning our families, friends, about the ethical positions we live by, about the sorts of ideals 
that we allow to inform our public policies and frame our community relations, about how we – 
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as individuals and as a society – deal with our failures and face our deaths.  These are matters of 
meaning and identity and they are the stuff that figures most prominently in our happiness and 
our misery, and on which the justness and well-being of our communities depend.  Their 
momentous nature, however, is compounded by there being no recipe for getting them right: as 
normative phenomena, they are necessarily open-ended endeavors where the way forward is 
illuminated by our ever-varying perspectives and presumptions.  This is why the work of making 
a meaningful life and a thriving society is ongoing.  It is also why it is so hard. 
 And this is also why our neglect of the philosophical inclinations of our youth is so 
unfortunate and, indeed, costly.  Our missed opportunity is not to have taught 4th graders the 
categorical imperative, or 7th graders Rawls’ ‘difference principle.’  The method of those 
working in the growing field of pre-college philosophy (though conspicuously lagging in the 
U.S.), and that which GPS employs in its ‘Young Philosophers of New York’ program, is to 
allow young people to explore philosophical ideas of their own initiative and from their own 
perspective.  The role of the philosopher in this setting is to facilitate this process, not to teach or 
instruct them on what great thinkers of the past or present have to say.  In a collaborative, 
organic atmosphere that places the students at the center, they are given the space to learn how to 
think through the very sorts of open-ended questions mentioned above, a process that allows 
them to develop the critical acuity and intellectual humility that as future leaders and future 
parents we will wish them to have.  And by introducing them to philosophy at an early age and in 
a welcoming and un-pressurized way, they are more likely to view its academic incarnation in 
favorable light.    
 The academic version of our discipline has its place.  Those drawn to keep alive the history 
of thought, as well as those eager to engage others in its current and future development are 
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performing a significant service for our species.  And yet a full justification of the protected 
space of the academy – essentially the ‘free lunch’ Socrates proposed the Athenian assembly 
provide for his services – should depend on the inclusion of a public-oriented dimension to a 
philosophy department’s mission.  Providing incentives and support for philosophical 
engagements in the cities their members work in should become standard practice for 
departments, especially those in public institutions.  Cities are our most vital social settlements as 
the urban environment is the most productive of the invention and reinvention of the human 
condition.  Through philosophy we become self-conscious of this process and aim to understand 
and direct it.  Philosophy was born in the city and belongs there. It’s time for philosophers to 
come home again.     
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Notes 
1 Which is not to say none. Some philosophers whom I mention below, and in the introduction on methodological 
practice, are doing very important and impactful work in New York.  
2 So too, to varying degrees, other public-oriented organizations and enterprises, such as Brooklyn Public 
Philosophers, The Columbia University ‘Rethink’ Program, and the Philosophical Café hosted by the New York 
Society for Ethical Culture. 
3 In terms of my own experience, the worst I have faced has been a very contentious and uncomfortable 
‘conversation’ during an event on the nature of money (in particular, on the propositions that we think of it as a 
public good and that we prohibit private financial institutions from profiting from its ‘creation’).  
4 Changes are afoot, however, as attempts to bring the classroom out into the street are increasing. See, for example, 
(Oxley & Ilea 2016).  
5 “[N]othing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.” (Davidson 2001: 141, 155) Davidson 
was, in turn, paraphrasing Richard Rorty (and no doubt many others). (See Rorty 1979: 178)  
6 (Case 2018) offers an especially crimped portrait of the discipline.  
7 See GPS website (www.philosophy.nyc). I discuss these and other efforts in the methodology intro  
8 We refer to it as a magazine rather than journal since we insist that the writing be free of technical jargon as well as 
many of the features and practices associated with scholarly journals such as extensive notes and citations.  
9 Statistics demonstrating the relatively high average/median salary of philosophy majors, or the claims of certain 
employers that they seek employees that are able to think, appear to have limited effect, either on students or 
administrators.  I know first-hand that neither such ‘evidence,’ nor the fact that a number of the recent valedictorians 
and salutatorians were philosophy majors, could ultimately save the Felician University (née College) philosophy 
department from being stripped of majors and being restructured as a joint study program with ‘Religious Studies.’  
                                                 
